La influencia de la necesidad de cierre cognitivo en la creencia en teorías conspirativas genéricas en población militar

Manuel Tomás Passero; Ben Tovin Jochay; Luis Carlos Jaume

doi:10.32351/rca.v8.331

Authors

Manuel Tomás Passero Universidad de Buenos Aires https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1823-7148
Ben Tovin Jochay Universidad de Buenos Aires https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2477-4022
Luis Carlos Jaume Universidad de Buenos Aires https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3700-5812

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.32351/rca.v8.331

Política de Crossmark DOI: https://doi.org/10.32351/politica-crossmark

Keywords:

Need for Cognitive Closure, Lay epistemic theory, Conspiracy Theories

Abstract

From the lay epistemic theory we derive the concept of Need for Cognitive Closure, which contemplates the underlying cognitive and motivational elements of individuals in the construction and use of knowledge, as well as in decision making and information search. The construct admits a gradient ranging from a high need for cognitive closure, i.e., seeking definitive and specific answers and reducing states of uncertainty, to a low need for cognitive closure, which allows coexisting with diverse causal explanations and tolerating ambiguity. This construct is constituted by two dimensions, the tendency to urgency, which is characterized by a state of rapid search for information, and the tendency to permanence, which seeks to freeze and make the information obtained impermeable. Conspiracy theories, in turn, have made it possible to give meaning to experience when conditions seem uncertain and random. Fulfilling the function of observing the world as something orderly and predictable. In relation to the influence of NCC on information processing, the present work sought to conduct an exploratory study on the existence of possible relationships with conspiracy theories. The Test-Revised Need for Cognitive Closure (TR-NCC) and the Generic Conspiracy Theories (GCB) scale were used in a sample of 267 participants. The results support the relationship between the tendency to urgency and certain dimensions of the GCB.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Author Biographies

Manuel Tomás Passero, Universidad de Buenos Aires

Es Lic. en Psicología (UBA). Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Psicología. Instituto de Investigaciones. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Ben Tovin Jochay, Universidad de Buenos Aires

Es Lic. en Psicología (UBA). Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Psicología. Instituto de Investigaciones. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Luis Carlos Jaume, Universidad de Buenos Aires

Es Lic. en Psicología (UBA). Magíster en Psicodiagnóstico y Evaluación Psicológica (UBA). Doctor en Psicología (UBA). JTP de Psicología del ciclo vital I, Facultad de Psicología, UBA: Investigador del Instituto de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Psicología (UBA-CONICET) Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina.

References

Allington, D., Duffy, B., Wessely, S., Dhavan, N. & Rubin, J. (2021). Health-protective behaviour, social media usage and conspiracy belief during the COVID-19 public health emergency. Psychological medicine, 51(10), 1763-1769. https://doi.org/10.1017/S003329172000224X

Baldner, C., Jaume, L. C., Pierro, A., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2019). The epistemic bases of prejudice: The role of need for cognitive closure. TPM: Testing, Psychometrics, Methodology in Applied Psychology, 26(3). doi:10.4473/TPM26.3.9

Brotherton, R. & French, C. C. (2014). Belief in conspiracy theories and susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 28(2), 238-248. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.2995

Brotherton, R., French, C. C. & Pickering, A. D. (2013). Measuring belief in conspiracy theories: the generic conspiracy belief scale. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 279-294. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00279

Cichocka, A., Marchlewska, M., Golec de Zavala, A., & Olechowski, M. (2015), ‘They will not control us’: Ingroup positivity and belief in intergroup conspiracies. British Journal of Psychology. 107(3), 556-576. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12158

Darwin, H., Neave, N. & Holmes, J. (2011). Belief in conspiracy theories. The role of paranormal belief, paranoid ideation and schizotypy. Personality and individual differences. 50(8), 1289-1293.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2011.02.027

Douglas, K. M. (2021). Are conspiracy theories harmless? Spanish Journal of Psychology, 24. 1-7. https://doi.org/10.1017/SJP.2021.10

Douglas, K. M. & Sutton, R. M. (2018) Why conspiracy theories matter: A social psychological analysis. European Review of Social Psychology, 29(1), 256-298. https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2018.1537428

Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M. & Cichocka, A. (2017). The psychology of conspiracy theories. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 26(6), 538-542. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417718261

Goertzel, T. (1994). Belief in conspiracy theories. Political Psychology. 15(4), 731-742. https://doi.org/10.2307/3791630

Grzesiak-Feldman, M. (2013). The effect of high-anxiety situations on conspiratorial thinking. Current Psychology, 32, 100 - 118.

Heine, S. J., Proulx, T. & Vohs, K. D. (2006). The meaning maintenance model: On the coherence of social motivations. Review of personality and social psychology , 10(2), 88-110. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1002_1

Horcajo, J., Díaz, D., Gandarillas, B., & Briñol, P. (2011). Adaptación al castellano del Test de Necesidad de Cierre Cognitivo. Psicothema, 23(4), 864-870.

Jaume, L. C., Etchezahar, E., Biglieri, J., & Cervone, N. (2014). La justificación del sistema económico y su relación con la necesidad de cierre cognitivo. In VI Congreso Internacional de Investigación y Práctica Profesional en Psicología XXI Jornadas de Investigación Décimo Encuentro de Investigadores en Psicología del MERCOSUR. Facultad de Psicología-Universidad de Buenos Aires.

Jaume. L, Cervone, N., Biglieri, J., & Quattrocchi, P. (2015). Propiedades psicométricas del Test revisado de Necesidad de cierre cognitivo (TR-NCC) en una muestra de estudiantes de la Universidad de Buenos Aires. Investigaciones en psicología, 20(3).

Jaume, L. C., Cervone, N., Biglieri, J., & Quattrocchi, P. (2015). Psicología del extremismo: la mediación de la necesidad de cierre cognitivo y el favoritismo endogrupal. In VII Congreso Internacional de Investigación y Práctica Profesional en Psicología XXII Jornadas de Investigación XI Encuentro de Investigadores en Psicología del MERCOSUR. Facultad de Psicología-Universidad de Buenos Aires.

Jaume, L. C., & Roca, M. A. (2020). La evaluación del perdón, los modos regulatorios y la necesidad de cierre cognitivo: construyendo una agenda de investigación. Subjetividad y Procesos Cognitivos, 24(1), 1-21.

Jaume, L. C., Roca, M. A, Passero, M. T. & Azzollini, S. (2021). La teoría epistémica laica y su enfoque cognitivo-motivacional del conocimiento. Persona, 24(2), 11-26. https://doi.org/10.26439/persona2021.n024(2).5438

Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. Psychological bulletin, 129(3), 339. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339

Kruglanski, A. W. (1989). Lay epistemics and human knowledge. Springer US: New York.

Kruglanski, A. W .(1990). Lay of epistemic theory in sociocognitive psychology. Psychological Research, 1(3), 181-197.

Kruglanski, A. W., Dechesne, M., Orehek, E., & Pierro, A. (2009). Three decades of lay epistemics: The why, how, and who of knowledge formation. European Review of Social Psychology, 20(1), 146-191. https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280902860037

Kruglanski, A. W., & Freund, T. (1983). The freezing and unfreezing of lay-inferences: Effects on impressional primacy, ethnic stereotyping, and numerical anchoring. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19(5), 448–468. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(83)90022-7

Kruglanski, A. W., Orehek, E., Dechesne, M., & Pierro, A. (2010). Lay epistemic theory: The motivational, cognitive, and social aspects of knowledge formation. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4(10), 939-950. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00308.x

Kruglanski, A. W., Raviv, A., Bar-Tal, D., Raviv, A., Sharvit, K., Ellis, S. & Mannetti, L. (2005). says who? Effects of epistemic authority on social judgment. Advances in experimental social psychology , 37 , 345-392.

Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind:" Seizing" and" freezing.". Psychological review, 103(2), 263-283. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.103.2.263

Lewandowsky, S., Cook, J., Oberauer, K., Brophy, S., Lloyd, E. A. & Marriott, M. (2015). Recurrent rage: conspiratorial discourse in the blogosphere triggered by research on the role of conspiracist ideation in climate denial. Journal of social and political psychology, 3(1), 161-197. https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v3i1.443

Marchlewska, M., Cichocka, A. y Kossowska, M. (2018). Addicted to answers: Need for cognitive closure and the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs. European Journal of Social Psychology, 48(2), 109-117. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2308

Mayseless, O. & Kruglanski, A. W. (1987). What makes you so sure? Effects of epistemic motivations on judgmental confidence. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39(2), 162-183. https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(87)90036-7

Orehek, E., Fishman, S., Dechesne, M., Doosje, B., Kruglanski, A. W., Cole, A. P. & Jackson, T. (2010). Need for closure and social response to terrorism. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 32 (4), 279-290.. https://doi.org/10.1080/01973533.2010.519196

Park, C. L. (2010). Making sense of the meaning-making literature: an integrative review of meaning-making and its effects on adaptation to stressful life events. Psychological Bulletin, 136 (2), 257-301. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018301

Pica, G., Jaume, L. C., & Pierro, A. (2020). Let’s go forward, I forgive you! On motivational correlates of interpersonal forgiveness. Current Psychology, 1-9.

Pierro, A., y Kruglanski, A.W. (2005). Revised Need Cognitive Closure Scale. Manuscrito no publicado, Università di Roma, La Sapienza.

Poon, K.-T., Chen, Z. & Wong, W.-Y. (2020). Beliefs in conspiracy theories after ostracism. Personality and social psychology bulletin , 46(8), 1234-1246. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167219898944

Recart, E., Jaume, L. C., Passero, M. T. & Azzollini, S. C. (2021). Efecto de la necesidad de cierre cognitivo en los estilos decisorios: un abordaje exploratorio. Psocial, 7(2), 27-38.

Sapountzis, A. & Condor, S. (2013). Conspiracy accounts as intergroup theories: challenging dominant understandings of social power and political legitimacy. Political Psychology , 34 (5), 731-752. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12015

Šrol, J., Mikušková, E. B. & Cavojova, V. (2021). When we are worried, what are we thinking? Anxiety, lack of control, and conspiracy beliefs amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. PsyArXiv Prepr, 35(3), 720-729 https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3798

Swami, V., Chamorro-Premuzic, T., & Furnham, A. (2010). Unanswered questions: a preliminary investigation of personality and individual difference predictors of 9/11 conspiracist beliefs. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 24, 749–761. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1583

Van Prooijen, J. W. (2019). An existential threat model of conspiracy theories. European psychologist, 25(1), 16-25. https://doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040/a000381

Van Prooijen, J. W. & Acker, M. (2015). The influence of control on belief in conspiracy theories: conceptual and applied extensions. Applied Cognitive Psychology , 29 (5), 753-761. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3161

Van Prooijen, J.W., & Douglas, K. M. (2017). Conspiracy theories as part of history: The role of societal crisis situations. Memory Studies, 10(3), 323-333. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698017701615

Valerie van Mulukom, Lotte J. Pummerer, Sinan Alper, Hui (Max) Bai, Vladimíra Čavojová, Jessica Farias, Cameron S. Kay, Ljiljana B. Lazarevic, Emilio J. C. Lobato, Gaëlle Marinthe, Irena Pavela Banai, Jakub Šrol, & Iris, Žeželj (2020). Antecedents and consequences of COVID-19 conspiracy theories: a rapid review of the evidence. 10.31234 / osf.io / u8yah (no publicado).

Van Prooijen, J. W. & Jostmann, N. B. (2013). Belief in conspiracy theories: the influence of uncertainty and perceived morality. European journal of social psychology , 43(1), 109-115. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.1922

Whitson, J. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Lacking control increases illusory pattern perception. Science, 322, 115–117. DOI: 10.1126/ciencia.1159845